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 Focus on different motives has waxed and waned 
in the short history of social psychology.  For example, 
the striving for cognitive consistency was proposed as a 
major human motivation by Festinger (1957) and inspired 
much of theorizing and research.  After two decades of 
research, however, the interest in consistency strivings 
waned and dissonance reduction got to be seen as subsidiary 
to ego-defense motives(Greenwald & Ronis, 1978). Only 
recently striving for consistency become once more seen 
as a fundamental principle of social information processing 
(Gawronski & Strack, 2012) and various compensations for 
inconsistency are recognized as different forms of basically 
the same palliative response to a violation of expectations 
(Proulx, Inzlicht & Harmon-Jones, 2012). The most 
interpersonally oriented consistency model – the balance 
theory proposed by Heider (1958) suffered a similar lot as 
the theory of dissonance – the former also generated a great 
amount of research (Crockett, 1982) but recently it seems to 
be half-forgotten.  In the present work we try to reinvigorate 
the balance theory by applying it to the explanation of 
interpersonal emotions, specifically, emotional responses 
to outcomes of other people.
 Emotions are indispensable elements of human 
life. They accompany nearly every our thought and action. 
Frijda (1988) argued that “emotions arise in response 
to events which are important to the individual’s goals, 
motives, or concerns” (p. 349).  When an event is evaluated 
as consistent with someone’s goals, the emotion is positive, 
and when it is inconsistent - a negative emotion appears. 
However, we also react emotionally to others who are 
present physically or symbolically.  Interestingly, our 
reactions can take several forms.  For example, sometimes 
we are happy about someone’s success, but sometimes we 
feel envy or resentment.  Similarly, we can derive pleasure 
from someone’s failure instead of showing empathy or 
sorrow.
 In this paper, we take a closer look at emotional 
reactions to other’s outcomes.  We briefly present previous 
studies on different emotions following the successes 
of other persons (especially joy and resentment) as well 
as their failures (especially sorrow and schadenfreude). 
Subsequently, we elaborate an explanation of emotional 
responses to other’s outcomes derived from the balance 
theory (Heider, 1958).  Our model predicts that the 
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perceiver’s emotional responses to someone else’s successes 
or failures may be either positive or negative depending on 
what brings balance within cognitive units (consisting of a 
perceiver, another person and the latter’s outcome).  Hence, 
we examine the rarely studied role of pre-existing attitudes 
and document their influence on emotional reactions to 
other’soutcomes.  Last but not least, we test the relation 
between self-interest and self-esteem and emotional 
reactions to other’s outcomes.
Diversity of Emotional Reactions to Other’s  
Outcomes: Joy, Resentment, Sorrow and 
Schadenfreude
 In the European-American culture high self-
esteem and positive emotions are valued (Tsai, Knutson, 
& Fung, 2006). Own successes evoke mainly positive 
emotions such as joy, pleasure or pride.  For example, it was 
demonstrated that own success, at least in individualistic 
cultures, is highly associated with pride, confidence and 
satisfaction (Imada & Ellsworth, 2011) or general pleasure 
(Zhang & Cross, 2011).  In particular joy, a feeling of great 
pleasure and happiness, can accompany a positive outcome. 
Interestingly, joy differs from other positive emotions such 
as elation or gladness (Bagozzi, 1991) and it is a synonym 
of happiness.  Harmon-Jones, Schmeichel, Mennit, and 
Harmon-Jones (2011) showed that joy is a low-approach-
motivated positive affect that negatively correlates with 
anger and determination.  
In general, positive emotions enable us to maintain 
or increase self-esteem. Consequently, successes are 
something that we strive for.  However, other’s successes 
can lead to negative emotions such as envy or resentment 
as well. Envy is an unpleasant and often painful feeling 
which consists in emotions such as inferiority, resentment 
or hostility (Smith & Kim, 2007). It lasts for a short time 
and is usually unexpected and unwanted (Heikkinen, 
Nikkonen, & Aavarinne, 1998). Parott and Smith (1993) 
claimed that envy is more controversial than other emotions 
such as anger or sadness; a person experiencing envy hardly 
reveals it because he or she is ashamed of it.  Resentment 
is a bitter feeling following successes of others who are 
perceived as not deserving their lot (Feather & Sherman, 
2002).  Although both envy and resentment are negative, 
they differ in that envy focuses on the lack of something 
enjoyed by another person, while the focus of resentment 
is a conviction that other’s good fortune is undeserved and 
unfair.  Both emotions are usually correlated and emerge in 
similar conditions of other’s successes.
 As in individualistic cultures people seek and 
aim to maintain positive self-views (e.g., Zhang & Cross, 
2011), successes are desired and failures avoided. This 
is evidenced, for example, by the fact that people make 
more internal attributions for successes than for failures 
(Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde & Hankin, 2004), and memories 
of successes are more accessible than memories of failures 
(Endo & Meijer, 2008).  Failures are usually associated with 
negative feelings such as dissatisfaction or sadness.  They 
are also very demanding for one’s self-esteem (e.g., Zhang 
& Cross, 2011). Failures of others lead to dissatisfaction, 
sadness and other unpleasant emotions, especially when 
they are evaluated as undeserved (Feather, 2006) and refer 
to well-liked people. Paradoxically, other’s failures can 
also result in a positive emotional state, for example in 
schadenfreude.  Schadenfreude is a German word which 
literally means the joy of another person’s failure (Heider, 
1958).  In other words, someone else’s negative experience 
educes a positive emotion.  When summarizing research on 
the antecedents of schadenfreude, Smith, Powell, Combs, 
and Schurtz (2009) concluded that despite being socially 
undesirable, this emotion commonly arises when the 
perceiver gains something from another’s misfortune, when 
the misfortune is deserved and when it befalls an envied 
person.  The gains refer mainly to the increases in self-esteem 
which follow other’s failures.  The role of deservingness has 
been widely described in previous literature (e.g., Feather, 
1999, 2006, Feather, & McKee, 2009, van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, 
& Goslinga, 2009, van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, & 
Nieweg, 2005).  For example, schadenfreude is more likely 
to occur if the misfortune of another person is perceived as 
deserved and when it concerns high achievers (e.g., Feather, 
1996).  Last but not least, while some studies documented 
the existence of the link between envy and schadenfreude 
(e.g., van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, Nieweg, & Gallucci, 
2006), others did not (e.g., Feather & Nairn, 2005).  Van Dijk 
and coworkers (2006) tried to resolve this inconsistency 
by showing that envy predicts schadenfreude when the 
perceiver and the target are comparable (e.g., are of the 
same gender) and the two emotions remain unrelated when 
the persons are incomparable (e.g., are of different gender).
Balance Restoration:  
A Neglected Motivational Force
 As discussed in the first section, emotional reactions 
to other’s outcomes can have different causes.  However, 
there is one model capable of predicting both positive 
and negative emotional reactions to other’s outcomes.  It 
is based on the Heiderian balance theory (1958) which 
explains formation, origins and change of attitudes.  It was 
chronologically the first concept of cognitive consistency, 
which dominated social psychology in 1960s (Greenwald 
et al., 2002), and similarly to other theories of this kind, 
it assumes that people strive for internal consistency in 
their attitudes and behaviors (see Wojciszke, 2011, for 
review).  Although the balance theory is quite old, it is 
still successfully applied in some areas of psychology, for 
example to predict team conflicts (Rovira-Asenjo, Gumi, 
Sales-Pando, & Guimera, 2013).
 According to the Heider’s theory, separate entities 
that are perceived as belonging to each other constitute 
a cognitive unit P-O-X, consisting of P (perceiver), O 
(other person) and X (impersonal entity e.g., an event, an 
idea, a thing).  All relations within a unit are conceived 
as interdependent.  The elements can create a “unit” 
or “sentiment” relations.  The former are for example: 
proximity, similarity, causality, membership, possession, or 
belonging.  For instance, P knows well O, O made X, or P 
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does not own O.  Sentiment relations include for example, 
to like, to esteem, to love, to value, and their opposites.  The 
cognitive units involve strong forces to balance emotional 
relations between the elements of the unit.  Importantly, 
balanced states within cognitive units are preferred by 
individuals, while imbalanced states are strongly avoided 
and associated with negative states; and at the same time 
they evoke strong motivation to restore the balance.  If 
balance restoration is impossible, a state of imbalance will 
produce tension (Heider, 1946). 
 Although the Heiderian model originally referred 
to attitudes and relationships, it can be successfully extended 
to emotions as well.  Pietraszkiewicz and Wojciszke (2014) 
demonstrated that emotional reactions may induce balance 
restoration within a cognitive unit.  In the present paper, 
we focus on cognitive units consisting of three elements: 
a perceiver (P), another person (O) and an outcome of this 
person (X).  According to Heider, three-element units are 
balanced when the number of positive sentiment relations 
is odd; otherwise a triad is in an imbalanced state.  As it 
was mentioned before, balanced states are preferred by 
the perceiver, while imbalanced are strongly avoided.  For 
example, if P and O have a positive relationship (e.g., P 
likes O) and so do P and X (e.g., P likes X), then if O and X 
have a negative relationship (so that the number of positive 
relations in the cognitive unit is two) there is a tension 
pushing towards either the O – X relationship becoming 
positive or one of the others becoming negative.  This 
tension may lead for instance to a change in the relation 
between P and O, P and X.  
 Basing on the above mentioned assumptions, it is 
possible to predict the relation between the perceiver and his 
or her result by systematic change of the perceiver’s attitude 
towards the other person, as illustrated in Figure 1. Thus, 
we can assume that if the successes of the other are always 
liked and failures disliked, then that constitutes positive 
(O + X) or negative (O – X) sentiment relations within 
P - O - X units.  Second, the relations between P and O can 
take two different forms: either the perceiver likes the other 
(P + O) or the perceiver dislikes the other (P – O).  Third, 
the perceiver’s responses to the other’s successes or 
failures are conceptualized as responses bringing balance to 
P - O - X units.  Having defined the relation between the 
perceiver and the outcome as well as that between the 
outcome and the other (i.e., failures are always disliked 
while successes are liked by the other), we can easily predict 
the perceiver’s emotional reactions to the other’s outcomes. 
In effect, perceivers are likely to respond with a positive 
emotional state to successes of liked others (joy) and to 
failures of disliked others (schadenfreude), and to respond 
with a negative emotional state to successes of disliked 
others (resentment) and to failures of liked others (sorrow).In 
other words, emotional states aim to restore balance within 
cognitive units.  Therefore, we claim that interpersonal 
attitudes play a key role in shaping emotional reactions to 
other’s experiences.  As a consequence, schadenfreude and 
resentment appear as reactions to a failure or success of a 
disliked other, while sorrow and joy are reactions to a liked 
other’s outcomes.
Figure 1.  Emotional responses to successes and failures of a liked and disliked person as a restoration of cognitive balance within a cognitive 
unit involving P (perceiver), O (other person) and X (other’s outcome).
Bereitgestellt von | Universitätsbibliothek Bern
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 16.12.15 08:50
299Striving for Consistency Shapes Emotional Responses to Other’s Outcomes
The Role of Self-Esteem and Self-Interest  
in a Domain
 In general, high self-esteem is associated with 
experiencing more happiness, optimism, and motivation 
than low self-esteem, as well as with lowered experience 
of depression, anxiety, and negative mood (Pyszczynski, 
Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004).  It is also 
well documented that people with low and high self-esteem 
react with different emotions to their own outcomes, 
especially persons of low self-esteem experience far more 
negative emotions in response to their failures (Blaine 
& Crocker, 1993; Taylor, 1991).  On the other hand, 
individuals of high self-esteem experience more positive 
emotions evoked by their own successes (and less negative 
emotions), in comparison to low self-esteem individuals 
(Wood, Heimpel, & Michela, 2003).
 Numerous authors have also noticed that the 
involvement of the self is probably a crucial precondition 
for experiencing both resentment and schadenfreude (e.g., 
McNamee, 2007; Portmann, 2000).  Other’s successes lead 
to envy when they pertain to domains which are personally 
relevant to perceivers, that is, where perceivers desire 
successes for themselves (Smith & Kim, 2007).  Similarly, 
other’s failures are pleasurable when they not only provide 
the perceiver with a subjective feeling of justice restoration, 
but also create an opportunity for downward social 
comparisons which boost the perceiver’s self-esteem.  At 
a group level, the self-focused pain of in-group inferiority 
is a major predictor of schadenfreude experienced after 
a failure of a previously successful out-group (Leach & 
Spears, 2009).
 The link between self-esteem and schadenfreude 
was shown experimentally by van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, 
Wesseling, and van Koningsbruggen (2011). They decreased 
their participants’ self-esteem via negative feedback on a 
task and found that those participants took more pleasure 
in reading about another person’s misfortune than those 
who had received no or positive feedback.  Decreased self-
esteem led to increased schadenfreude in both threat-related 
and threat-unrelated domains.  In another set of studies, they 
documented that low self-esteem intensifies the experience 
of schadenfreude unless there is no possibility for self-
affirmation (van Dijk, van Koningsbruggen, Ouwerkerk, & 
Wesseling, 2011).
 Schadenfreude is directed toward others and it is 
strongly tied to the self. As a consequence, Heider (1958) 
suggested that pleasure derived from other’s misfortune 
should be more intense when it refers to self-relevant 
domains. This happens because self-interest (both at 
anindividual and group level) boosts the self-relevance of 
other’s actions within a domain.  The role of self-interest 
in experiencing schadenfreude towards out-groups was 
demonstrated directly by Leach, Spears, Branscombe 
and Doosje (2003). They analyzed the sentiment of 
schadenfreude among soccer fans in response to a rival 
soccer team’s misfortunes. They documented that the 
intensity of schadenfreude derived from the rival’s failure 
was especially strong for the participants among whom self-
interest in the soccer was high.  In the present study, we 
further explored the role of self-esteem and self-interest in 
evoking emotional reactions to other’s outcomes.  Based on 
previous findings, we reasoned that self-interest intensifies 
schadenfreude and resentment.  Additionally, we included 
self-esteem in our analyses in order to investigate a possible 
link among emotional reactions to other’s failure, in 
particular schadenfreude, resentment, and self-esteem.
Present Research
 The present study aimed at showing that emotional 
reactions to other person’s outcomes function as responses 
bringing balance within cognitive units.  In other words, 
we tested the basic hypothesis that the perceiver’s attitude 
toward other persons is a moderator of his or her emotional 
reactions to the latter’s outcomes (failures and successes). 
We asked our participants to recall and describe a situation 
involving a success or a failure of a person whom they 
liked well or disliked.  Additionally, we analyzed the role 
of self-interest in shaping emotional reactions towards these 
outcomes.  Hence, the recalled outcomes fell either into a 
domain which the participants found personally important 
or into a domain which they found unimportant.  The 
participants were also asked to describe their emotional 
responses to the situation, both answering an open-ended 
question about their feelings and rating their emotions on a 
few provided scales.  Finally, we measured the participants’ 
self-esteem.
Method
 Participants and Design.  The participants were 
203 Polish students from four different universities.  Their 
mean age was M = 26.6 (SD = 6.36) years, 121 were women 
and 82 were men.  The participants were randomly assigned 
to one of eight conditions of a between-participants design: 
2 (attitude: positive vs. negative) x 2 (outcome: success 
vs. failure) x 2 (self-interest: involved vs. not involved).
They were recruited to the study individually by the study 
assistant. i.e., the study assistant approached a person he/she 
met in the university’s corridor and asked if he or she wants 
to participate.  Having given their consent, the individuals 
were randomly allocated to particular experimental 
conditions by drawing one of the eight cards with group 
numbers from the pool.  All participants took part in the 
study voluntarily.
 Procedure.  The participants were asked to recall 
and describe a situation from their past in which someone 
they liked or disliked succeeded or failed in an action. 
Additionally, one half of the participants recalled a situation 
regarding a domain in which they had interest (aspired for 
successes themselves), the other half – a domain in which 
they did not have interest (no personal aspirations).  Every 
participant recalled only one situation.  Subsequently, 
during an open question stage, they were asked to write 
down a few names of emotions they experienced in the 
recalled situation.  Finally, they evaluated their emotions 
on nine provided rating scales.
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 Dependent Measures. Emotion descriptions 
given in the answers to the open question were compiled 
into a common alphabetical list.  Each item on the list 
was subsequently rated for its positivity-negativity by five 
independent judges using seven-point rating scales ranging 
from -3 (definitely negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (definitely 
positive).  The judges were very consistent (Kripendorff’s 
alpha = .74), so we averaged their ratings.  Then we came 
back to individual protocols and, using the judges’ ratings, 
we computed an index of the average emotional state 
reported by each participant.  Additionally, the relatively 
large sample size allowed us to conduct a frequency analysis 
concerning the specific emotions listed by our participants.
 After the participants had written their descriptions, 
they were asked to rate the experienced emotions on a seven 
point scale (from 1 – did not experience this feeling at all 
to 7 – very strongly experienced this feeling). Four items 
measured positive emotions: joy, satisfaction, pleasure 
and happiness (Cronbach’s α = .93).  Five items measured 
negative emotions: resentment, upset, anger, sadness and 
gloom (Cronbach’s α = .93).  Subsequently, the participants 
evaluated how much they liked a person from the recalled 
situation, ranging from 1 (I definitely dislike him/her) to 7 
(I definitely like him/her) and evaluated how close the 
person was for them, ranging from 1 (definitely not close to 
me) to 7 (definitely close to me).  Finally, they filled the ten-
item Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale pre-adapted previously 
to the Polish language (α = 0.90) and provided information 
regarding their age and gender.
Results and Discussion
 Manipulation Checks. We performed an analysis 
of variance in the 2 (outcome) x 2 (attitude) x 2 (self-
interest) design on the attitude as a dependent variable.  It 
showed the predicted effect of attitude, F(1, 195) = 182.35; 
p < .001, η² = .48.  In the liking group the target was indeed 
liked to a higher degree (M = 5.81, SD = 1.07) than in the 
disliking group (M = 3.20, SD = 1.7). 
 Average Emotional State.  The 2 (outcome) x 2 
(attitude) x 2 (self-interest) analysis of variance performed on 
the average emotional state yielded the predicted interaction 
between the attitude and outcome, F(1, 195) = 92.77; p < 
.001, η²= .32.  As can be seen in Figure 2, a success resulted 
in a negative emotional state when it happened to a disliked 
person (M = -.92, SD = 1.13) and in a positive emotional 
state when it happened to a well-liked person (M = .96, SD 
= 1.38).  The difference between these two means was large, 
t(97) = 7.35, p < .001, d = 1.87.  Furthermore, a failure led 
to a negative emotional state when it happened to a person 
who was liked by the perceiver (M = -.15, SD = .16) and to 
a positive state when it happened to a disliked person (M = 
1.2, SD = 1.42).  The difference between these two means 
was also large, t(102) = -5.7, p < .001, d = 1.37.
 Although the interaction between attitude, 
outcome, and self-interest failed to reach significance, 
F(1,195) < 1, the basic pattern depicted in Figure 2 was 
slightly different in the condition involving self-interest 
versus not.  In the condition involving self-interest, one 
simple effect disappeared – responses to a success (M = 
Figure 2. The average emotional state reported in reactions to successes and failures of persons who were liked or disliked.  Whiskers represent 
standard errors of the mean.  Higher scores indicate a more positive emotional state.
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0.26, SD = 1.39) and failure (M = -0.23, SD = 0.80) of a well-
liked person failed to differ significantly, t(52) = 1.59, p = 
.12.  In the condition not involving self-interest the pattern 
was identical to that of Figure 2 and this crucial difference 
between the success (M = 1.66, SD = 0.95) and failure (M 
= -0.08, SD = 1.19) of a well-liked person remained highly 
significant, t(50) = 5.83, p < .001.  These subtle differences 
show that self-interest involvement moderates the attitude 
by outcome interaction so basic for our Heiderian reasoning. 
When self-interest is involved (the perceivers have their 
own aspirations for high outcomes) the success of a well-
liked person is threatening to the self (due to upward social 
comparisons) and it does not induce joy (M = 0.26 does not 
differ from the neutral value of zero).  However, when self-
interest is not involved (the perceivers have no aspirations 
for success) the success of a well-liked person opens the 
possibility of basking in reflected glory and induces much 
of joy (M = 1.66 is much higher than zero).  The importance 
of self-interest is also reflected by a significant interaction 
between self-interest and outcome, F(1, 195) = 10.90; p < 
.001, η² = .05.  This interaction meant that in the self-interest 
involved condition responses to other’s successes were 
generally negative (M = -0.38, SD = 1.38) whereas responses 
to other’s failures where generally positive (M = 0.66, SD 
= 1.29) and this difference was highly significant, t(107) 
= 4.06, p < .001, d = 0.78. However, when the perceivers 
had no personal aspirations for success, their responses to 
others’ success (M = 0.56, SD = 1.65) and failure (M = 0.30, 
SD = 1.48) were similar, t(92) < 1.
 Summing up, we documented that failures of a 
disliked person induce a positive emotional state, while 
failures of a well-liked person – a negative emotional 
state.  Similarly, successes of a disliked other resulted in a 
negative emotional state, while successes of a liked other 
– in a positive emotional state.  It is consistent with our 
assumption that interpersonal attitudes moderate emotional 
reactions to other’s outcomes.  Furthermore, this pattern 
was slightly moderated by the involvement of self-interest 
understood as having personal aspirations for success in the 
outcome domain or lack of thereof. 
 Since the average emotional state is a bipolar 
measure with 0 as a neutral value, we tested whether 
the mean emotional state in the eight conditions differed 
significantly from 0 using one sample t tests.  The analyses 
showed that when a well-liked person succeeded in a 
domain in which the participant did not have self-interest, 
the average emotional state differed significantly from 0, 
t(24) = 8.75, p < .001.  When a disliked person succeeded, 
both in an important and unimportant domain, the average 
emotional state differed significantly from 0 as well, t(28) 
= -4.52, p < .001 and t(18) = -3.31, p < .01.  The analysis 
also revealed that the average emotional state differed from 
zero, t(25) = 8.36, p < .001, when a disliked person failed 
in an important domain.  All these means are presented in 
Table 1.
 Positive and Negative Emotions. Subsequently, 
the ratings of the experienced emotions were subjected to a 
2 (outcome) x 2(attitude) x 2 (self-interest) x 2 (emotions: 
positive vs. negative) analysis of variance with repeated 
measures on the last factor. A significant and strong 
interaction effect between the attitude, the outcome and 
emotions appeared, F(1,195) = 224.76; p < 0.001, eta² = .54. 
The attitude and the outcome influenced the experienced 
emotions.
 As presented in Figure 3, successes of a disliked 
other induced more negative emotions than successes of a 
well-liked other (M = 4.8, SD =1.67 vs. M = 1.89, SD = 
1.27), t(87) = -9.77, p < .001, d = 2.9.  In addition, successes 
induced more positive emotions when they referred to a 
liked person than to a disliked person (M = 4.66, SD = 1.37 
vs. M = 2.06, SD = 1.42), t(97) = 9.27, p < .001, d = 2.6. 
Failures of a liked other induced more negative emotions 
Condition Mean      SD t
Success
Liked
Person
Self-Interest 0.25 1.38 0.94
No Self-Interest 1.66 0.95 8.75***
Disliked 
Person
Self-Interest -0.94 1.13 -4.52***
No Self-Interest -0.88 1.16 -3.31**
Failure
Liked 
Person
Self-Interest -0.23 0.8 -1.51
No Self-Interest -0.7 1.18 -0.3
Disliked 
Person
Self-Interest 1.62 0.99 8.36***
No Self-Interest 0.74 1.69 2.09*
Table 1. Mean emotional state in the eight conditions and their 
difference from zero (single sample t tests)
Note.  * p < .05,  ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Figure 3. Intensity of positive and negative emotions to successes and 
failures of liked or disliked persons. Whiskers represent standard 
errors of the mean.
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than failures of a disliked person (M = 4.53, SD = 1.6 vs. 
M = 2.29, SD = 1.59), t(102) = -7.12, p < .001, d = 2.23, 
while failures of a disliked person induced more positive 
emotions than failures of a liked person (M = 4.09, SD = 
1.89 vs. M = 1.6, SD = .95), t(69) = -.83, p < .001, d = 
2.49.  Successes of a liked person induced the most positive 
emotions, while successes of a liked other induced the least 
negative emotions. 
 The analysis also revealed a significant interaction 
effect between the outcome, self-interest and emotions, 
F(1,195)=12.56, p < .001, η² = .06.  However, it appeared 
that the only significant difference between experiencing 
positive and negative emotions occurs in the case of a 
failure in a domain in which a perceiver does not have own 
interests, t(49) = -3.07, p < .01, d = 1.42.  The participants 
experienced more negative emotions (M = 2.08, SD = .29) 
than positive emotions (M = 1.86, SD = .27) as a reaction to 
a failure in a domain in which they did not have self-interest. 
In the case of a domain in which they were interested, 
there was no significant difference, t(53) =.-72, p = .94. 
Therefore, this shows that self-interest plays some role only 
in the case of empathetic reactions to other’s failures in a 
domain which is unimportant for the perceiver.
 As self-interest did not appear to play an important 
role in evoking emotional reactions towards other’s lots, 
we aimed to verify the intensity of positive and negative 
emotions in all four conditions, omitting self-interest 
condition.  Thus, we conducted a few one sample t tests, 
whose results are presented in Table 2.  The results showed 
that the difference between positive and negative emotions 
was significant for all conditions.  Moreover, the signs of 
emotions and the outcome were consistent in the positive 
attitude condition.  A success evoked positive emotions 
and a failure evoked negative emotions.  In the negative 
attitude condition, the signs of emotions and the outcome 
were discordant.  The participants enjoyed a failure and 
regretted a success. 
 What is important, positive emotions and negative 
emotions were correlated (r² = -.63; p < 0.01).Similarly, the 
average emotional state (the open question) correlated with 
positive emotions (r = .56, p < .001), and with negative 
emotions (r = -0.6, p < .001). A similar correlation was 
found in the case of the average emotional state in the 
negative attitude condition (r² = -.61; p < 0.001).
 Specific Emotions. In this analysis, we combined 
data both from the present study and the pilot study of 
Pietraszkiewicz and Wojciszke (2014).  This was justified 
as the methodologies of both studies were identical.  As 
a result, we obtained a sizeable sample of participants (N 
= 397, Mage = 23.62, SD = 7.1) which enabled us to run 
analyses on specific emotions.  We proved that interpersonal 
attitudes were a major moderator of specific emotions 
reported in response to other’s outcomes.  The frequency 
data reported in Table 3 clearly shows that successes do 
not have any intrinsically positive value, nor is a failure 
intrinsically negative.  All the emotions reported by more 
than 10% of the participants heavily depended on whether 
the person winning the success or suffering the failure 
was liked or disliked by the perceiver.  Joy was the most 
frequently recalled positive emotion – as many as 84.5% 
of the participants reported this emotion in response to a 
success of a well-liked person, but only 10.1% in response 
to a success of a disliked one, and this difference was large 
(phi = .75).  However, in response to a failure, 68.4% of 
the participants reported joy when recalling outcomes of a 
disliked person, but only 7.5% when recalling outcomes of a 
well-liked one, and this difference was also large (phi = .63). 
As can be seen in Table 3, similarly large differences were 
found in the case of satisfaction.  Admiration was reported 
only in the case of a success and only when the success 
was won by a well-liked person.  Sympathy was reported 
only after a failure and mainly when it was suffered by a 
well-liked person.  A similar picture emerged in the case of 
negative emotions.  Sadness was reported after a success of 
a disliked (but not well-liked) person and after a failure of 
a liked (but not disliked) person.  These differences were 
also large, as can be seen in Table 3, and they were equally 
large in the case of anger.  Dissatisfaction was reported very 
frequently after a disliked person’s success, but also quite 
often after a failure of a well-liked other.
Condition Mean      SD t
Success
Liked 2.77 2.24 8.85**
Disliked -2.73 2.79 -6.79**
Failure
Liked -2.92 2.07 -10.45**
Disliked 1.8 2.67 4.70**
Liked Disliked   χ2 Phi
Joy
Success 84.5 10.1 108.899*** .75
Failure 7.5 68.4 80.273*** .63
Satisfaction
Success 37.1 3 35.71*** .43
Failure 6.6 62.8 71.07*** 0.6
Admiration
Success 36.1 7.1 24.49*** .35
Failure 3.8 1.1 < 1.00  -
Sympathy
Success 4.1 0 4.17 .15
Failure 58.5 17.9 34.61*** .42
Sadness
Success 9.3 39.4 42.03*** .35
Failure 74.5 15.8 69.43*** .58
Anger
Success 12.4 50.5 32.95*** .41
Failure 35.8 7.4 23.39*** .34
Dissatisfaction
Success 31 66.7 25.04*** .36
Failure 23.6 7.4 3984** .23
Table 2. The difference between the level of intensity of positive and 
negative emotions in response to outcomes of persons who were well-
liked or disliked
Table 3. Percentages reporting different emotions in response to 
outcomes of persons who were well-liked or disliked
Note.  ** p< .001
Note.  * p< .05,  ** p< .01, *** p< .001.
Bereitgestellt von | Universitätsbibliothek Bern
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 16.12.15 08:50
303Striving for Consistency Shapes Emotional Responses to Other’s Outcomes
 To summarize, successes of a well-liked person 
bring emotions which are strikingly similar to those reported 
after failures of a disliked person and vice versa.  Responses 
to successes are positive (joy) and responses to failures are 
negative (sorrow), but only as far as the perceivers hold 
positive attitudes towards those to whom these outcomes 
happen.  When the perceivers hold negative attitudes 
towards others, the latter’s successes result in negative 
emotions (resentment) and their failures result in positive 
emotions (schadenfreude).  These internally consistent 
results show the crucial role of interpersonal attitudes in 
shaping responses to outcomes of other persons’ actions. 
This is in line with our hypotheses derived from the balance 
theory – that emotional responses to other’s outcomes 
restore the balance within cognitive units comprising the 
perceiver, the other and the outcome.
The Role of Self-Esteem
 Subsequently, we conducted analyses of 
correlations between self-esteem, positive and negative 
emotions. The findings showed a limited role of self-
esteem.  Self-esteem inhibited positive emotions when a 
disliked other succeeded in a domain in which participants 
had self-interest (r = .44, p < .005).  In addition, self-esteem 
negatively correlated with negative emotions when the other 
succeeded in a domain in which the perceiver had interest (r 
= -.42, p < .05).  As previous analyses failed to demonstrate 
a clear role of self-interest, we conducted correlational 
analyses omitting this condition in order to further verify the 
role of self-esteem.  It appeared that self-esteem negatively 
correlated with negative emotions in a situation when a 
well-liked other succeeded, r = -.37, p < .01, and negatively 
correlated with positive emotions when a disliked other 
succeeded, r = -0.30; p < .05.  Other correlations appeared 
to be insignificant.  No other effects involving self-esteem 
appeared significant.
General Discussion
 The present research aimed at documenting the 
major role of balancing principle in shaping emotional 
responses to other’s outcomes.  Responses to other’s 
successeswere either positive (joy) or negative (resentment) 
and this valence was strongly influenced by the perceiver’s 
pre-existing attitude toward the person in question. 
Similarly, emotional responses to other’s failures were 
positive (schadenfreude) when the attitude toward the 
person was negative, but the responses were negative 
(sorrow) when the attitude was positive.  This pattern 
of responses was predicted basing on the balance theory 
(Heider, 1958) and the assumption that responses toward 
other’s lot are fleeting emotional reactions which restore the 
balance within a cognitive unit (consisting of the perceiver 
who may like or dislike the other person, who always likes 
his or her success and dislikes his or her failures).  These 
consistent results were obtained by different emotional 
measures – mean emotional state, scalesmeasuring positive 
and negative emotions and frequency of specific emotions). 
 These results supplement the previous findings on 
emotional reactions toward other’s outcomes.  For example, 
Ortony, Clore and Collins (1988) pointed out that liking 
is one of four variables (next to desirability of the event 
for-other and for-self, and deservingness) which affect the 
intensity of resentment and schadenfreude, while disliking 
is one of four variables affecting happy-for emotions (e.g., 
happy-for, pleased-for) and sorry-for emotions (e.g., pity 
or compassion).  However, they treat “liking as an intensity 
variable rather than as part of the eliciting condition” 
(Ortony et al., 1988, p. 97).  Similarly, Smith (2000) in his 
analysis suggested that liking can weaken the sensation of 
resentment, and thus can, in turn, strengthen schadenfreude. 
He documented the latter assumption and showed that the 
less the other is liked, the less schadenfreude is evoked by 
his/her failure.  Hareli and Weiner (2002) documented that 
other-directed negative emotions (such as anger, hatred and 
disgust) can lead to pleasure in another’s misfortune which 
is independent of envy and/or competition; in particular, 
they showed a positive relation between other-directed 
negative emotions and deriving pleasure from another’s 
misfortune.  However, their studies were limited to disliking 
relations, failures in particular, whereas the role of positive 
attitudes was not analyzed.  Thus, our work complements 
this gap.
 However, in our work we do not only demonstrate 
the role of pre-existing attitudes in shaping emotional 
reactions towards other’s outcomes.  Our research expands 
the current work utilizing balance theory (e.g., Greenwald 
et al., 2002) and contributes to the revitalization of cognitive 
consistency as a core principle in social psychology (cf. 
Gawronski & Strack, 2012).  In other words we show that 
a “forgotten motivation” toward psychological balance can 
be succesfully used to predict emotional reactions to other’s 
outcomes.  
 Importantly, the role of pre-existing attitudes in 
shaping emotional reactions appeared to be stronger than 
the influence of self-interest.  Self-interest appeared to play 
only a limited role in shaping responses to successes and 
failures of well-liked others.  We failed to demonstrate 
that experiencing resentment and schadenfreude wuld be 
intensified when they refer to domains important for the 
participants.  It seems that, in contradiction to previously 
mentioned results (Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 
2003), when strong attitudes are involved, self-interest 
has limited influence on shaping emotional reactions to 
other’s failures and successes.  In other words, the role of 
interpersonal attitudes is documented whether the perceiver 
has or does not have self-interest in the domain in which 
the other’s outcome appears.  It is consistent with findings 
of Pietraszkiewicz and Wojciszke (2014) who showed 
that restoring balance plays a stronger role in shaping 
emotional responses of joy and sorrow than the perceptions 
of deservingness.  Although the deservingness theory has 
dominated current research on schadenfreude and has been 
widely tested, those empirical tests typically failed to take 
pre-existing attitudes into account.
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 Similarly, we demonstrated only a limited role of 
self-esteem.  It appeared that the higher self-esteem, the 
more empathetic reactions to a well-liked other’s successes 
(more positive emotions) and a disliked other’s success 
(less positive emotions).  These results are consistent, for 
example, with the findings of Chambliss and her colleagues 
(2012).  They showed that joy caused by someone else’s 
successes is higher among non-depressed undergraduates 
in comparison to mildly-depressed ones.  Unfortunately, we 
failed to demonstrate the role of self-esteem in experiencing 
schadenfreude.  However, there are some suggestions in the 
literature that such a link exists (e.g., van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, 
Wesseling, & van Koningsbruggen, 2011).  One reason of 
that might be the way of measurement of self-esteem.  In 
current study, we measured global self-esteem, while above 
mentioned authors demonstrated the role of state self-
esteem (Heatheron & Polivy, 1991).
 Last but not least, it should be noted that the 
present study has some methodological limitations.  It 
was based on retrospective reports consisting of recalling 
events and a person who was involved.  Because different 
participants recalled different events from their personal 
past this procedure introduced much of error variance. 
However, Pietraszkiewicz and Wojciszke (2014, Study 2) 
provided their participants exactly the same information 
about attitudes and outcomes (as well as the outcome 
deservingness) and obtained findings very similar to the 
present ones.  Emotional responses to other’s lot appeared 
to be shaped mainly by the balancing principles. 
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